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The Fishery Conservation and
Management Act: The States' Role in




Before passage of the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (FCMA),1 United States international fishery policy was mainly
the concern of the State Department and the Department of Com-
merce. Fishing beyond the territorial seas of the individual states
was controlled primarily through international agreements and com-
missions with ineffective enforcement powers. While the fishing in-
dustry began to assert greater influence over international fishery
policy in the 1970s,2 a coordinated voice for coastal states3 in these
decisions had to await passage of the FCMA in 1976.
Of even greater importance to the coastal state and its fishery
policy is the FCMA's influence over neighboring coastal states'
fishery management schemes. Prior to the FCMA, individual states
developed their own policies regarding fisheries located within their
territorial seas." Each state was free to establish its own policy which
normally reflected the state's fishing fleet's and processors' preferred
catch. A patchwork of differing gears, sizes, quotas and seasons de-
veloped reflecting these institutional preferences. Passage of the
FCMA and its regional management concept has permitted coastal
states with policies more consistent with the national standards
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1971, University of
Virginia; J.D. 1973, Baylor University School of Law; LL.M. 1983, Temple University School
of Law.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982).
2. A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 266-67 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as A. HOLLICK].
3. The term "coastal state" signifies states in the United States that have significant
coast lines and marine fishery interests. The term "coastal nation" refers to countries having
interests in fishery policy.
4. A long line of cases decided by the United State Supreme Court established state
autonomy over fishery policy in their territorial seas. See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying
text.
enunciated in the Act directly to influence neighboring coastal states'
policies that are inconsistent with the FCMA's goals and standards.
II. United States International Fisheries Policy Before Adoption of
the FCMA
Professor Ann L. Hollick, former Director of Policy Assessment
Staff, Bureau of Oceans, Environmental and Science Affairs at the
Department of State, in U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the
Sea, presents a well documented, concise description of United
States foreign policy as it related to fisheries before adoption of the
FCMA.5 World War II marked the rapid acceleration of unilateral
extensions of coastal nation jurisdiction over the sea.6 Many com-
mentators suggest that President Truman's declarations of control of
the continental shelf and fishery resources triggered the rush to ex-
tend jurisdiction.7 The United States' extension was rapidly followed
5. A. HOLLICK, supra note 2.
6. The idea that a coastal nation could extend its exclusive control over the seas adjacent
to its coasts has been a source of debate and controversy for centuries. The great jurisdictional
debates between Grotius and Selden occurred to a large extent because of early claims to such
authority. Grotius in MARE LiBERUM (R. Magoffiin trans. 1916) argued against the position
that nations could extend their sovereignty over any area of the sea beyond a narrow band
adjacent to the nation's coast.
John Selden, in his work Of the Dominion Or, Ownership of the Sea, argued the opposite,
claiming that historic precedent permitted and even encouraged such practice. Vattel, in his
great work Law of Nations (Scott, Chitty ed. 1863) expressed the compromise position stating
as follows:
But this reason [need to appropriate land for food] cannot apply to things
[which are in themselves inexhaustable] and consequently, it cannot furnish any
just grounds for seizing the exclusive possession of them. If the free and common
use of a thing was prejudicial or dangerous to a nation, the care of their own
safety would authorize them to reduce that thing under their own domin-
ion. . . . But this is not the case with the open sea, on which people may sail
and fish without the least prejudice to any person whatsoever, and without put-
ting anyone in danger. No nation, therefore, has a right to take possession of the
open sea, or claim the sole use of it, to the exclusion of other nations.
Vattel anticipated, and gave a defensible justification for unilateral extensions of coastal nation
control based on necessity. The need to compromise the theories of Grotius and Selden
culminated in the present Law of the Sea Treaty.
7. Hollick, U.S. Ocean Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Hollick, The Truman Proclamations]. In making his Continental
Shelf statement, Truman used the argument and justification articulated by Vattel. Presiden-
tial Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 compilation).
Whereas the Government of the United States of America, aware of the long
range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals, holds
the view that efforts to discover and make available new supplies of these re-
sources should be encouraged. . . . Whereas recognized jurisdiction over these
resources is required in the interest of their conservation and prudent utilization
when and as development is undertaken;. ...
NOW THEREFORE I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States
of America, do hereby proclaim the following policy of the United States of
America with respect to the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the
continental shelf. Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently
utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the United States regards the
natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States, subject to its juris-
by similar unilateral extensions of control by other nations over liv-
ing as well as nonliving resources adjacent to their territorial seas. 8
To limit the logical extension of this philosophy, the division
into private enclaves of increasingly large areas of the ocean, a num-
ber of international fishery agreements and conventions dealing with
other aspects of the law of the sea were negotiated and signed.9 For
example, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention was designed
to regulate the fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic through a Com-
mission called the International Commission on the Northwest At-
lantic Fisheries (ICNAF).' 0 Most commentators and Congress agree
that ICNAF failed.1" One fishery, the herring population in the
Georges Banks fishing area off the New England coast, fell below
acceptable population levels by 1976, the year of passage of the
FCMA, primarily because of the lack of effective controls by signa-
tory nations over fishing by nonsignatory nations like the German
Democratic Republic.1 2 Many of these early attempts to control
foreign fishing on traditional American fishing grounds lacked effec-
tive input from fishermen.
By 1948, the domestic fishing industry had established, through
Congress and the State Department, certain limited input into for-
eign policy decisions affecting its interests. 8 The fishing industry,
unlike the individual coastal states, recognized the need for influenc-
ing foreign policy that impacted on fishery resources. This input,
diction and control.
The proclamation was followed by the passage of the Outer Continental Shelf Land Acts
which codified the policy expressed in Truman's proclamation, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
8. Hollick, The Truman Proclamations supra note 7, at 55. Hollick states as follows:
The Truman Proclamations were announced on September 28, 1945. A
month later, Mexico incorporated its continental shelf as national territory. Sim-
ilarly, in March 1946 Panama laid claim to the continental shelf itself, rather
than merely to the resources of the shelf. In October 1946 Argentina went even
further, declaring the sea above the continental shelf as well as the shelf itself to
be under Argentine sovereignty.
Id.
9. For examples of the fishery agreements see the International Convention for the High
Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 205
U.N.T.S. 65; the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention, February 8, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 477,
T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S. 157. The Law of the Sea Conventions were: Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Sept. 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5000, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Fishing and Conservation of the Liv-
ing Resources of the High Seas, Mar. 20, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, June 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
10. Ten countries signed the original agreement-Canada, Denmark, France, Great
Britain, Ireland, Newfoundland, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United States.
11. See Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977) (Vaughn Anthony's
remarks); 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48
(1975); Senate Commerce Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess., memorandum on S. 961 to the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee B-4 (Comm. Print 1975).
12. See Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043, 1046 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977).
13. A. HOLLICK, supra note 2, at 63.
however, lacked effectiveness because of institutional differences in
the requirements of the various segments of the industry. Hollick
correctly divides and analyzes the nations' fishing interests through
segmentation based upon geographic boundaries.14
The first group, located in the Northwest Atlantic fishery, fished
primarily for staples, like cod, haddock, hake and red fish.' 5 In the
Gulf of Mexico, the primary fishery was shrimp. In the northern Pa-
cific, fishermen principally harvested salmon, halibut and herring.
Tuna fleets, located primarily in San Diego, fished throughout the
Pacific."
A truly unified domestic fishery position was difficult to achieve
because the different groups had varied foreign policy require-
ments.' 8 For example, the fishermen who fished off the coasts of
Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire sought relief from in-
creasing competition offered by highly mechanized foreign fishing
fleets. 9 The submerged lands dispute between the Gulf Coast states
and the United States stymied attempts to expand shrimping
zones. 20 Distant water fishing fleets feared retaliatory closure of
Latin American waters if foreign vessels were excluded off United
States' shores."
The United States Department of State, reacting to mounting
pressures applied by the fishing industry, created an Office of the
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Fisheries and Wildlife.2  The
natural ally of the domestic industry, the Department of Interior,
had little input into foreign policy. In 1956, Congress increased the
Department of Interior's role in foreign fishing policy through the
addition of two new agencies.23 The congressional initiative stalled,
however, because of concern about the constitutionality of requiring





18. Id. To a large extent, the requirement of balancing the interests of the distant water
fleets and the coastal fishermen dictated the exclusion of highly migratory species from the
management provisions of the FCMA. Section 1813 of the FCMA specifically excludes these
species including tuna.
19. Staff of Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of
the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 367-79 (Comm. Print 1976) [herein-
after cited as A Legislative History]; A. HOLLICK, supra note 2, at 80-81.
20. A. HOLLICK, supra note 2, at 81.
21. Id. at 80-81.
22. Id. at 81.
23. Id. at 31-81. The Department of Interior played an increasingly important role in
fishery policy during the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. Actually, according to Hollick, Sec-
retary of Interior Harold Ickes attempted to expand the United States' jurisdiction seaward to
100-150 miles during the war. Ickes' policies in large part resulted in the Truman
Proclamations.
tional fishery negotiations."" Thus, Hollick concludes, the Depart-
ment of State firmly controlled foreign fisheries policy during the
1950s and 1960s.15
Another explanation for the fishing industry's lack of influence
on foreign fishery policy lies in the manner in which United States
ocean policy developed. The major domestic interests that dictated
policy in the early 1970s were the petroleum industry, the military,
the deep sea bed mining interests and the marine science commu-
nity.26 Hollick correctly identifies the two major policy problems that
faced the United States as delimitation of boundaries of national ju-
risdiction over the sea bed and the nature of the regime beyond
coastal state jurisdiction."
Each of the four special interests were strong enough to influ-
ence United States ocean policy. Briefly stated, the Department of
Defense desired to limit the unilateral expansionist tendencies of the
petroleum and hard mineral mining industries because of a fear that
boundary extensions to accomodate these interests would restrict na-
val force mobility and threaten free transit passage.2 8 The two indus-
trial conglomerates desired protection to guarantee the safety of
their growing investment in deep sea bed exploration, development
and production.2 9 The marine science community feared that bound-
ary extension would inhibit scientific research.
The State Department sought to approve these divergent inter-
ests. Its overall control of ocean policy required a balancing of the
domestic concerns enunciated by the four groups.3 0 The State De-
partment's ultimate goal was to reach an international agreement on
the use of ocean space.31 As a result, the Department preferred a
limited boundary extension approach to ocean jurisdiction, with in-
ternational control beyond these limits.32 The Department of De-
fense rejected a compromise solution proposed in 1970.8" Finally, a
new policy with nominal support from Defense emerged, but opposi-
24. Id. at 81.
25. Id.
26. A. Hollick, United States Ocean Politics, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 467, 471-80
(1973) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Ocean Politics].
27. Id. at 472.
28. Id. at 474-75.
29. Id. at 473-75.
30. Id. at 478-79.
31. Id. at 478.
32. Id. at 479-80.
33. Id. According to Hollick, the compromise consisted of the adoption of an intermedi-
ate zone in the diputed area between the 200 meter isobath and the edge of the continental
margin. Within this intermediate area, the coastal nation would explore and develop minerals
while foreign scientific and military interests could not be excluded. The Department of De-
fense rejected this solution because it believed anything other than a narrow continental shelf
policy coupled with an accepted international agreement would not halt unilateral extensions
of control. Interior appeared to be amenable to the State Department's position. Id. at 481-82.
tion arose from the Department of the Interior.84
Eventually, the dispute reached the President, who announced
the following policy:
It is equally important to assure unfettered and harmonious use
of the oceans as an avenue of commerce and transportation and
as a source of food. For this reason the United States is cur-
rently engaged with other states in an effort to obtain a new
law-of-the-sea treaty. This treaty would establish a 12 mile limit
for territorial seas and provide for free transit passage through
international straits. It would also accommodate the problems of
developing countries and other nations regarding the conserva-
tion and use of living resources of the high seas. 5
United States policy urged rejection of national claims beyond the
200 meter isobath and establishment of an international body to
manage the production of resources from the area."
Meanwhile, the United States co-ordinated its fishery policy
with its territorial sea and straits policy.' Indeed, fishing interests
were viewed as bargaining chips for a favorable resolution on territo-
rial seas and straits issues.38 The United States proposed a "prefer-
ential fishing rights" approach, affording a coastal nation preference
in historic coastal fisheries near its shores.3 9 This approach favored
domestic inshore fishery interests at the expense of distant water
fishing concerns like the tuna fleet.40
The entire domestic industry, however, finally acted in concert
to influence the negotiations, pushing instead for a "species" ap-
proach. 41 This approach permitted the United States to apply prefer-
ential rights to inshore fisheries, leaving highly migratory fisheries to
be separately regulated. This position presented a more even-handed
34. Elliot Richardson, then Chairman of the Undersecretaries Committee, formulated
the new policy. This compromise retained the intermediate zone but incorporated this zone
into the international regime. Defense conditionally agreed, but Interior balked because of a
fear of creating an area held in trust for the international community.
35. U.S. Policy for the Seabed, 62 Department of State Bulletin 737, 738 (1970).
36. U.S. Ocean Politics, supra note 26, at 485-86.
37. Id. at 487.
38. Id. at 488.
39. Id. at 489. Hollick suggests that the fishing industry knew nothing about any United
States discussion regarding policy on international fishing until February 18, 1970, when Am-
bassador Stevenson announced the United States' "preferential rights" position. Incredibly, the
industry was unaware that discussions were underway using fishery policy as a possible conces-
sion for a favorable straits and territorial sea resolution. In addition, the institutional differ-
ence and preference at work within the industry fragmented any possible coherent policy on
the part of the industry.
40. Id. at 488-89.
41. Id. at 489. Hollick argues that the various factions in the industry joined forces
when they found out they had been excluded from the negotiations.
The species approach dictated that preferential rights only applied to species close to a
coast, not to highly migratory fishes.
policy regarding the entire industry."2
Despite the increased input by the fishing industry itself, domes-
tic fishing interests still suffered from under-representation. The
coastal states of this nation continued to lack coherent input into
international fishery policy. While the theory of preferential rights
seemed to protect coastal fisheries to some degree, the reality of the
continuing presence of large, highly sophisticated foreign fishing
fleets continued to cause overfishing off the North Atlantic and Pa-
cific coasts. The delay in negotiating a Comprehensive Law of the
Sea Treaty and the continuing depression of the domestic fleet com-
bined to force Congress to ensure interim protection of domestic
fisheries.
Because of its federal system of government, the United States
historically has permitted each state to manage the fishery stocks
located within its internal waters and its territorial seas. By 1855,
the United States Supreme Court repeatedly had recognized that
each state held the fishery resources within its boundaries for the
common good of the people of the state.48 In Smith v. Maryland,"
the Court clearly enunciated the states' responsibilities and preroga-
tives in managing their resources as follows:
The State holds the propriety of this soil for the conservation of
the public rights of fishing thereon and may regulate the modes
of that enjoyment so as to prevent the destruction of the fishery.
In other words, it may forbid all such acts as would render the
public right less valuable or destroy it altogether. This power
results from the ownership of the soil, from the legislative juris-
diction of the State over it and from its duty to preserve
unimpaired those public uses for which the soil is held.4
5
The origin of the power to regulate and control the living re-
sources within a state's boundaries descended from English common
law as a right that the Crown passed on to its colonies and which
survived the Revolution and creation of the United States." The
early cases that addressed state control over fishery resources dealt
with immobile animals like oysters and clams.47 Questions regarding
the states' management authority over free swimming and highly mi-
gratory species that only spent part of their lives within a state's
territorial waters remained.
42. Id. at 489-90.
43. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139
U.S. 240 (1891); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 395 (1877).
44. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
45. Id. at 75.
46. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. at 527-29.
47. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (planting oysters).
The decision in Toomer v. Witsel 48 put some of these questions
to rest. The case involved a challenge to a South Carolina law that
placed a tax on pounds of shrimp taken within the territorial sea of
the state. Nonresidents paid one hundred times the amount taxed to
South Carolinians. Because shrimp eggs hatch in estuaries, the
adults spend their lives in both the territorial seas off the host state
and in areas seaward of the territorial waters. This case clearly
presented the issue of state control over animals that live both within
and beyond a state's waters. The Court, while striking down the tax-
ation scheme as being an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce, reiterated the power of a coastal state to regulate its fisheries.
The Court rejected an argument by the nonresident fishermen that
South Carolina had no authority to manage fisheries beyond the low
water mark.""
The Court illustrated the pre-emptive effect of federal legisla-
tion on the management of fisheries within the territorial waters of a
state in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.50 The Commonwealth of
Virginia severely limited the right of nonresidents and aliens to take
fish from the state's territorial waters. Such a restriction conflicted
directly with federal licensing of vessels engaged in coastal fishing.
Relying on the rationale employed by Chief Justice Marshall in Gib-
bons v. Ogden,51 the Court reasoned that the Virginia scheme vio-
lated federal supremacy in the regulation of commerce. The federal
license granted the license holder, regardless of residency, the right
to fish on the same terms as the resident of each state.
At the same time that the Court struck down the constitutional-
ity of the specific Virginia statute, it once again affirmed the power
of a state to "impose upon federal licenses reasonable, nondiscrimi-
natory conservation and environmental measures otherwise within
their police power." The Court reviewed the historical precedents
discussed above, reaffirming the validity of state regulation of
fisheries in a nondiscriminatory manner.6 2
48. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
49. Id. at 393.
50. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
51. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
52. 431 U.S. at 268. The shift away from an ownership theory as the basis of support
for state management policies was further articulated in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979). In Hughes, the Court ruled that an Oklahoma statute, which prevented the taking of
minnows caught in Oklahoma from the state, violated the commerce clause. The Court took
pains to overrule the ownership theory announced in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896), although presumably leaving undisturbed Geer's basic holding that states hold re-
sources in trust. Hughes merely made explicitly clear what the Court had suggested in Toomer
and Seacoast, by quoting from Seacoast:
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game
preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or animals.
Neither the State nor the Federal Government, any more than the hopeful
fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to posses-
To an extent, the mere existence of a variety of coastal states
managing the fisheries within their territorial seas dictates the frag-
mentation of policies. Perhaps this diversity, more than anything,
prevented a well coordinated fisheries lobby by the states in refer-
ence to international fisheries policy. Undoubtedly, this splintering of
management authority and objectives has led to difficulty in influ-
encing neighboring coastal states' management schemes.
Actually, the fishing and processing industries of a particular
state often dictated the management scheme. Gear preferences of
the fishermen, size preferences of the processors and seasonal fluctu-
ations in the resource combined to create the fragmentation of
coastal states' management schemes. Not until the adoption of the
FCMA did the coastal state have a direct and legally protected
method of influencing both foreign fishery policy and the policy of
neighboring states.
Ill. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act
In 1976, the FCMA was passed by the United States Congress
and signed by President Ford. The Act regulates both foreign and
domestic fishing in the Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ), which ex-
tends from the seaward boundary of each state's territorial sea5" to
200 miles offshore.54 Impatience with the progress of the Law of the
sion by skillful capture. . .. The 'ownership' language of cases such as those
cited by appellant must be understood as no more than a 19th century legal
fiction expressing the 'importance' to its people that a State have power to pre-
serve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource [citing Toomer].
Under the modern analysis, the question is simply whether the State has exer-
cised its police power in conformity with State laws.
431 U.S. at 284.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(8), § 1811 (1982). The FCMA defines "fishery conservation zone"
as follows:
There is established a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States
to be known as the fishery conservation zone. The inner boundary of the fishery
conservation zone is a line coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of the
coastal states, and the outer boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such a
manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which
the territorial sea is measured.
54. In 1947, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the United States had para-
mount rights to lands underlying the territorial sea of California, United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19 (1947), and in 1950, made the same ruling regarding lands underlying the territo-
rial waters of Louisiana and Texas in United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950). These
cases culminated a twenty-year battle over rights in the resources underlying these lands. See
supra note 23 for the roots of the government's strategy.
In 1953, in reaction to these decisions, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1982), to re-establish state control over these lands. The legislation
provided a boundary definition as follows:
The seaward boundary of each original coastal State is approved and con-
firmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line or, in the
case of the Great Lakes, to the international boundary. Any State admitted sub-
sequent to the formation of the Union which has not already done so may extend
its seaward boundaries to a line three geographical miles distant from its coast
line, or to the international boundaries of the United States in the Great Lakes
Sea Conference and growing realization that overfishing in the area
was reaching catastrophic proportions combined to ensure passage.
Disenchantment with international fishery agreements likethe
NAFC grew."' Domestic fishing interests faced increased foreign
or any other body of water traversed by such boundaries. Any claim heretofore
or hereafter asserted either by constitutional provisions, statute, or otherwise,
indicating the intent of a State so to extend its boundaries is approved and con-
firmed, without prejudice to its claim, if any it has, that its boundaries extend
beyond that line. Nothing in this section is to be construed as questioning or in
any manner prejudicing the existence of any State's seaward boundary beyond
three geographical miles if it was so provided by its constitution or laws prior to
or at the time such State became a member of the Union, or if it has been
heretofore approved by Congress.
43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976).
Because the last sentence of the definition permitted an extension of the territorial sea
beyond 3 miles in certain instances, a new round of litigation ensued. In United States v.
Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), the Court rejected claims of extended territorial seas for Louisi-
ana, Mississippi and Alabama. The Court permitted Texas' territorial sea to be extended to
three marine leagues (slightly more than 10 statute miles), because of the location of the
Texas boundary when she entered the Union. Texas was a Republic before her entrance. In
United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960), the Court granted Florida three marine leagues
off the gulf coast. These decisions explain why the FCZ is not uniform in width around the
United States.
55. See Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (lst Cir. 1977); see also A Legislative
History, supra note 19, at 433. Senator Pastore from Rhode Island, during Senate debate,
expressed the growing frustration with and urgency over ICNAF's failures:
I am concerned about further delay and I remain skeptical about the effec-
tiveness of international negotiation despite some heralded successes in establish-
ing overall fishing quotas by the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) recently.
My concerns flow from the general and fundamental lack of success of
ICNAF, a vehicle for international negotiation, over the past quarter century.
Now ICNAF was established when the Northwest Atlantic - the fishing grounds
off New England, the Georgia Bank and the Grand Banks - was still the richest
and most prolific fishing grounds in the world.
With ICNAF watching these great fishing grounds, which New Englanders
fished for centuries without doing ecological damage, the foreign fleets moved in
and decimated the largest stocks of fish in the world. Not until the very exis-
tence of the haddock was immediately threatened did ICNAF take firm action.
But damage to the haddock was so great that the member nations of ICNAF
were forced to clamp a ban on all directed fishing for haddock.
Id. Senator Hathaway from Maine echoed his colleagues' distress:
The effects of foreign fishing has been especially acute off the New England
coast. In a particularly rich fisheries area-that of Georges Bank - 88 percent
of the total catch was taken by U.S. fishermen as recently as 1960. As of 1972,
the figures were turned around and foreign fishing accounted for over 89 percent
of the total catch from the Georges Bank area. In just 12 years the relative
catch of U.S. and foreign fishermen was reversed. This statistic reflects untold
economic disruption for our individual fishermen and, of course, an increasingly
adverse balance of payments for the Nation as increasing market demand for
fish products has been met by imports. Testifying before the Small Business
Committee last spring at hearings on the "Economic and Loan Problems of the
Fisheries Industry," Richard Reed of the Maine Sardine Council surveyed the
damage done by foreign fishing to the sardine industry. He said that from 1941
to 1960, the sardine business had an average pack of about 2 million cases a
year. From 1962 to 1975, after foreign fishing started in earnest, the average
pack was from 900,000 to I million per year. He felt that foreign fishing was
resulting in the taking of the larger, strong fish and that a decline in the number
of juveniles was taking place.
At these hearings, fisherman after fisherman stressed the need for extension
competition at the same time that traditional fishing grounds used by
United States distant water fishing vessels were closed because of
unilateral extensions of territorial seas and the establishment of ex-
clusive economic zones." Domestic fishing pressure, contrary to pop-
ular belief at the time, contributed to, if not caused, the overfishing
of many offshore populations.57 The domestic fishing industry will-
ingly submitted to national regulation of its fishing activity beyond
the territorial sea in return for similar control over foreign fishing. 8
As adopted, the FCMA was a compromise between domestic
and foreign interests. The Act provides that a series of regional
fishery management councils will direct fishing conservation and con-
trol in the FCZ.59 Each management council consists of representa-
tives from state agencies with primary marine fishery management
responsibility, the regional director of the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) and a number of individuals nominated by the gov-
ernor of the coastal state to represent industry, recreational
fishermen and the public.0°
of the fisheries limits as a necessary first step in correcting this situation; and
significantly, they recognized that extended jurisdiction was not a complete or
simple answer to a complex situation, but rather than each of them-and the
industry as a whole-would have to cooperate in conservation efforts for the sake
of the preservation of the industry itself.
id. at 450.
56. A. Hollick, supra note 2, at 85-95, 266-71; A Legislative History, supra note 19, at
330. Senator Brooke of Massachusetts, responding to arguments that the FCMA would trigger
unilateral extensions, replied:
I also believe U.S. action on fisheries is simply not the determining factor in
the various unilateral decisions being considered around the globe. Seventeen
coastal States have established fishing and economic zones wider than 100 miles
from their shores. Three of those were established, without any preceding U.S.
action, in the last four months.
Id. at 330.
57. A Legislative History, supra note 19, at 364-67. Senator Gravel's remarks are
illustrative:
I have already stated I agree that we have got to do something from a manage-
ment point of view. But I think it should be understood, as the Senator agreed
with me except for probably a minor technicality. I repeat his arithmetic again.
Of the stocks overfished, six are overfished because of American effort, six be-
cause of foreign effort, and four because of United States and foreign effort.
Id. at 370.
58. Id. at 372.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982).
60. Id. § 1852. Voting members on each council consist of the following:
(b) Voting members.-(1) The voting members of each Council shall be:
(A) The principal State official with marine fishery management responsi-
bility and expertise in each constituent State, who is designated as such by the
Governor of the State, so long as the official continues to hold such position, or
the designee of such official.
(B) The regional director of the National Marine Fisheries Service for the
geographic area concerned, or his designee, except that if two such directors are
within such geographical area, the Secretary shall designate which of such direc-
tors shall be the voting member.
(C) The members required to be appointed by the Secretary shall be ap-
pointed by the Secretary from a list of qualified individuals submitted by the
Governor of each applicable constituent State. With respect to the initial such
The Act assigns each council the task of preparing fishery man-
agement plans (FMPs) for each fishery located in the FCZ over
which the council has authority.61 The FMP must assess the present
and future maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for the individual
fishery as well as the optimum yield (OY) for the fishery. 2 Addi-
tionally, each plan must assess and specify the portion of the OY
which, on an annual basis, would not be harvested by domestic
fishermen and as such could be allocated to foreign vessels." Each
plan also must meet and be consistent with national standards enun-
ciated in the Act."
appointments, such Governors shall submit such lists to the Secretary as soon as
practicable, not later than 45 days after April 13, 1976. As used in this subpara-
graph, (i) the term "list of qualified individuals" shall include the names (in-
cluding pertinent biographical data) of not less than three such individuals for
each applicable vacancy, and (ii) the term "qualified individual" means an indi-
vidual who is knowledgeable or experienced with regard to the management,
conservation, or recreational or commercial harvest, of the fishery resources of
the geographical area concerned.
Nonvoting members include:
(A) The regional or area director of the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service for the geographical area concerned, or his designee.
(B) The commander of the Coast Guard district for the geographical area
concerned, or his designee; except that, if two Coast Guard districts are within
such geographical area, the commander designated for such purpose by the com-
mandant of the Coast Guard.
(C) The executive director of the Marine Fisheries Commission for the
geographical area concerned, if any, or his designee.
(D) One representative of the Department of State designated for such
purpose by the Secretary of State, or his designee.
61. Id. § 1853.
62. Id. The FCMA defines "optimum yield" in the following manner:
The term "optimum", with respect to the yield from a fishery, means the
amount of fish -
A. which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with par-
ticular reference to food production and recreational opportunities; and
B. which is proscribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable
yield from such fishery, as modified by a relevant economic, social, or ecological
factor.05 OPT SPACES
63. Id.
64. Id. § 1851.
National standards for fishery conservation and management
(a) In general
Any fishery management plan prepared, and any regulation promulgated to implement any
such plan, pursuant to this subchapter shall be consistent with the following national standards
for fishery conservation and management:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing
while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best
scientific information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed
as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed
as a unit or in close coordination.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate be-
tween residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign
fishing privileges among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall
be (A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to
promote conservation; and (C) carried out in such manner that no particular
individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such
After receiving an FMP, the Secretary of Commerce reviews
the plan and notifies the council of acceptance or rejection of the
plan as proposed. 6 In reviewing the plan, the Secretary is required
to consult with the Secretary of State about the foreign fishing com-
ponent.66 The Act permits foreign fishing, and the legislative scheme
grants the right to foreign nationals to fish within the FCZ, assum-
ing that an allocable amount of fish is available in the targeted
stock.6
7
IV. Coastal State Participation in Foreign Fishing Decisions Made
by the Secretary
The FCMA thus provided for the first time a legally protected
mechanism for coastal state input into allocation of fish to foreign
nationals. The inclusion of each state's primary marine fishery man-
agement official as a voting member on the appropriate regional
council insures a direct voice in decisions on levels and types of fish-
ing efforts. By participation in the calculation of the excess OY
available to foreign fishing interest, the coastal state can influence
foreign fishery policy. The coastal state normally possesses superior
information concerning its fleet's hold and vessel capacity, which is
crucial to the determination of the catch to be expected by United
States vessels.
Similarly, many states have better statistics than NMFS on the
actual numbers of fish in a population because of the historic pat-
terns of state control over its fisheries and the limited resources of
the federal agency. Many of the stocks in the FCZ, which are cur-
rently being regulated under the FCMA, previously underwent con-
stant assessment by the coastal state throughout their range because
of the transistory nature of the animals and their importance to the
state's fishing industry. Good management practice requires popula-
tion figures throughout the lifetime of the animals for the state to be
able to predict pressure and to adopt measures to protect the fishery.
In addition to direct input into the OY allocation determination,
the council, through review and comment on permit applications by
privileges.
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, pro-
mote efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such mea-
sure shall have economic allocations as its sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take into account and
allow for variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources, and
catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable,
minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.
65. Id. § 1854.
66. Id. § 1854(b),(c).
67. Id. § 1853(a)(4)(B).
foreign vessels, can influence the Secretary's decision to grant or
deny a particular foreign fishery permit.0 8 Finally, the Act permits
challenges to regulations promulgated by the Secretary to implement
FMPs6 9
The judicial review provisions of the FCMA, however, permit
challenges only to the regulations that implement the FMPs, not the
FMPs themselves. The Act limits review to a determination of
whether the Secretary acted arbitrarily or capriciously, contrary to
the Constitution, in excess of statutory authority or without the ob-
servance of procedures required by law. 0 Injunctive relief to delay
implementation of FMPs is denied."1
The State of Maine pursued judicial review in challenging allo-
cations by the Secretary of Commerce to foreign fishing interests in
the Gulf of Maine."' The Act requires the Secretary to adopt prelim-
inary FMPs (PFMPs) if a council fails or does not have time to
prepare an adequate FMP.73 To the fullest extent possible, the Sec-
retary must consider the same factors that the council would have
considered in preparing the PFMP.7 4 Each plan that either the Sec-
retary or the council prepares must contain conservation and man-
agement measures applicable to both domestic and foreign vessels. A
description of the fishery, an assessment of OY and MSY and a cal-
culation of domestic vessel capacity along with the portion of OY
which will not be taken by the domestic fleet, and which conse-
quently is available to foreign vessels, also must be included. 5
The State of Maine challenged the Secretary's determination of
the amount of herring allocated to foreign fishing vessels.7  The
PFMP for herring calculated a stock size of 218,000 metric tons
(m.t.), some 7000 m.t. below the estimated level recruitment fail-
ure. 77 The Secretary estimated that United States vessels capable of
catching herring would harvest only a portion of the 33,000 m.t.
OY.7 8 The Secretary further determined that the level of United
States fishing effort would be 12,000 m.t. and therefore allocated the
remainder to the foreign fleet. This calculation was primarily based
on previous ICNAF allocations. 9
68. Id. § 1824(b)(4),(5).
69. Id. § 1855(d).
70. Id.
71. Id. The Act expressly excludes Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 500-556 (1982), providing for injunctive relief.
72. Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043 (1st Cir. 1977).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c) (1982).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 1853(a)(4) (1982).
76. Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d at 1045.
77. Id. at 1046.
78. Id. at 1047.
79. Id.
Maine argued insufficient allocation to U.S. vessels because the
U.S. fleet's hold capacity exceeded 12,000 m.t. Additionally, Maine
asserted that the Act required no foreign fishing when a stock fell
below the level of possible recruitment failure.8" The court rejected
these arguments, relying on an interpretation of the Act that permits
the taking of excess OY in any situation, despite stock levels, if a
council or the Secretary calculates that an OY exists.8 The court,
however, did require supplementation of the record to demonstrate
why the OY figures were not arbitrary or capricious.82
The specifics of the Maine challenge are less important than the
principle established. The suit represented the first state challenge of
allocations to foreign nationals of fishery resources under the exclu-
sive control of the United States. The FCMA had given the states
both a management role in the determination of allocations and a
judicial forum to challenge decisions inimicable to their interests. Al-
though the Maine case involved the challenge of a PFMP, the same
principles apply to challenges of foreign fishing allocations in FMPs
prepared by a council.
Despite the importance of the principles established in Maine v.
Kreps, two crucial questions remained to be answered. As noted, the
FCMA only speaks to challenges of regulations adopted by the Sec-
retary to implement FMPs.83 The regulations, not the plan, are sub-
ject to judicial review.84 If the courts had narrowly interpreted the
judicial review provisions of the Act, the Secretary would have ap-
proved FMPs that did not conform with the provisions and national
standards in the Act, with little chance of successful challenge.
Such an interpretation has been rejected repeatedly. In Wash-
ington Trollers Association v. Kreps,85 a suit involving a challenge
to the ocean salmon fishing FMP in the Pacific, the district court
denied that Congress could have intended to give the Secretary such
broad discretion. In rejecting the Secretary's argument that the
states could challenge only the regulations, the court declared as
follows:
Under the scheme created by the Act, approval of the plan
80. Id. at 1048. Recruitment failure signifies the failure of a group of spawning fish to
produce enough young to repopulate the group.
While Maine's position did not find direct support in FCMA's provisions, her argument
made sense because the herring stock was below the level where recruitment failure, or irre-
versible damage was feared.
81. Id. at 1048-49.
82. Id. at 1049.
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d) (1982).
84. Id. See Washington Trollers Association v. Kreps, 466 F. Supp. 309, 312 (W.D.
Wash. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 645 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1981); Louisiana v. Baldridge,
538 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.D. La. 1982).
85. 466 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
itself does not adversely affect anyone nor can it be considered
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in court. Any adverse effect results only from the regulations
adopted to promulgate the plan and the Act provides an ade-
quate remedy through judicial review of the regulations. Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, therefore, plan approval
standing alone would not be reviewable.
The Act appears to contemplate, however, that regulations
to implement a fishery management plan may be promulgated
only after the Secretary has found the plan to be consistent with
the national standards under the Act and other applicable provi-
sions of law. Thus, the existence of a plan conforming to the
statutory prerequisites is a condition to the Secretary's authority
to promulgate regulations.
This does not mean that the Court may make a de novo
examination of the adequacy of the plan. The Secretary's find-
ing that the plan complies with the statute is binding on the
Court unless it is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
It does mean that the Court, in passing on the validity of the
regulations, must review the plan to the extent necessary to de-
termine whether the Secretary abused her discretion in making
her finding."6
This interpretation was adopted by a second district court in
Louisiana v. Baldridge,87 a case involving a challenge to the FMP
adopted by the Gulf of Mexico Regional Fishery Management
Council (Gulf Council) for shrimp. This case also discusses standing
of states to challenge FMPs. In Baldridge, the Secretary disputed
Louisiana's standing to challenge the FMP for shrimp and argued
that the State of Louisiana could not maintain a suit for injuries to
its citizens.88 The district court rejected the Secretary's argument,
noting that the government's position ignored the historic role of
states in managing resources in their coastal waters. 89 The court re-
lied on a statement by Judge Gignoux in Maine v. Tamano that
". .a State has sovereign interests in its coastal waters and marine
life, as well as in its other natural resources, which interests are sep-
arate and distinct from the interests of its individual citizens."90 In
addition, the court relied on Judge Gignoux's unpublished decision in
Maine v. Kreps,9" in which he had used the same rationale to sup-
port standing for Maine in her challenge to the Secretary's herring
PFMP. This aspect of the ruling had not been challenged by the
86. Id. at 312.
87. Louisiana v. Baldridge, 538 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. La. 1982).
88. Id. at 628-30.
89. Id. The Court reviewed historic precedents giving states such management authority.
90. 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (D. Me. 1973).
91. No. 77-45 (D. Me. 1977).
Government in the court of appeals. Both the State of Louisiana and
its state coastal fishery management agency were granted standing
in the Louisiana challenge.92
Clearly, the FCMA presents each coastal state with both a judi-
cial and an administrative forum to influence the foreign fishing pol-
icy of the United States. Through state participation in the prepara-
tion of FMPs, the calculation of OY and through comments on
individual foreign fishing permit applications, the FCMA affords a
state an institutionalized voice in the calculation of foreign fishing
pressure. The FCMA, as interpreted by the courts, also gives the
states standing to challenge the Secretary's approval of and imple-
mentation of FMPs that allow foreign fishing in the FCZ. The
FCMA, however, affords states another, and possibly a more impor-
tant, extraterritorial voice. It gives a state a valuable indirect method
of influencing the management practices of neighboring coastal
states.
V. Coastal State Input Into Domestic Fishery Decisions Made by
Neighboring States
As already suggested, domestic fishing and processing industries
often dictate state management policies for coastal fisheries. Despite
the use of interstate fishery compacts like the Atlantic States Marine
Fisheries Compact,93 a wide variation in management methods and
strategies has developed. Prior to the FCMA, only through compacts
and "diplomacy" could one state influence management policies of
her sister states.
The FCMA envisions council control over fisheries located
within the territorial waters of a state only in rare instances of com-
plete failure on the part of the coastal state to manage a fishery
correctly. 94 The nature of most free swimming fin fish and crus-
92. Louisiana v. Baldridge, 538 F. Supp. at 629.
93. The provisions of this compact can be found at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. TIT. 12, §§
4601-4656 (1981). SIGNATORIES TO THE COMPACT INCLUDE MAINE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, MAS-
SACHUSETTS, RHODE ISLAND, CONNECTICUT, NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, DELAWARE, MARY-
LAND, VIRGINIA, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA.
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b) (Supp. 1983). The Secretary may pre-empt state jurisdiction
only under the following circumstances:
(b) Exception-
(1) If the Secretary finds, after notice and an opportunity for a
hearing in accordance with section 554 of Title 5, that-
(A) the fishing in a fishery, which is covered by a fishery manage-
ment plan implemented under this chapter, is engaged in predominantly
within the fishery conservation zone and beyond such zone; and
(B) any State has taken any action, or omitted to take any action,
the results of which will substantially and adversely affect the carrying
out of such fishery management plan;the Secretary shall promptly notify
such State and the appropriate Council of such finding and of his inten-
tion to regulate the applicable fishery within the boundaries of such State
taceans, however, requires that the fishing fleet of a state fish in the
FCZ adjacent to the home state and in the territorial seas and FCZ
of adjacent states.
Most states have a territorial sea of only three miles. The state
normally may manage exclusively within this area and within the
internal waters of the state. The appropriate Regional Fisheries
Management Council (RFMC) manages the FCZ seaward of the
state's territorial seas.
The FCMA envisions that the coastal state, through its repre-
sentatives on the RMFC, will provide input into the FMPs developed
by the council. While the FCMA is designed to take into account
this input, its basic purpose is to ensure achievement of certain na-
tional standards. 95 The central philosophy in reference to manage-
ment, found in section 301(a)(5) of the Act, states: "Conservation
and management measures shall, where practical, promote efficiency
in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure
shall have economic allocations as its sole purposes." 96 If the man-
agement schemes of neighboring states conflict, then the council
often must determine which measures it believes more completely
fulfill the requirements of the national standards.
One of the best examples of how two state management prac-
tices came into conflict and were resolved through council action in-
volved the Gulf coast shrimp fishery. Shrimp represent the most val-
uable domestic fishery.97 From 1964 to 1977, twenty-three percent
the value of all fish landed in the United States came from shrimp.9"
Commercial shrimping in the Gulf of Mexico accounted for over
eighty percent the value of all United States shrimp landings.99
The Gulf shrimp industry employs three types of processing
strategies.100 These include frozen shrimp, breaders and canners.
Canning processes, located primarily in Louisiana and Mississippi,
use small to medium shrimp.101 Processors of frozen and breaded
(other than its internal waters), pursuant to such fishery management
plan and the regulations promulgated to implement such plan.
(2) If the Secretary, pursuant to this subsection, assumes responsi-
bility for the regulation of any fishery, the State involved may at any time
thereafter apply to the Secretary for reinstatement of its authority over
such fishery. If the Secretary finds that the reasons for which he assumed
such regulation no longer prevail, he shall promptly terminate such
regulation.
Act of Apr. 13, 1976, Pub.L. 94-265, Title III, § 306, 90 Stat. 355.
95. See supra note 64.
96. Id.





shrimp, generally located in Texas, use large shrimp. 102
In response to the needs of their fishing industries, the States of
Texas and Louisiana managed their shrimp resources to maximize
the catch of the target size. Texas historically closed its three league
(nine nautical mile) territorial sea for a portion of each year until
the shrimp reached a size suitable for its industry to maximize the
number of usable pounds caught. Its policy thus reduced the discard
of undersized brown shrimp. 108
Louisiana, however, managed its fishery to ensure a year- round
supply of canning-sized shrimp for its industry. 104 It had no closed
season, and its fleet often went to the FCZ adjacent to the Texas
territorial sea during Texas' closed season to catch canners.
In formulating the FMP for the Gulf shrimp fishery, the Gulf
Council faced tremendous pressure from Texas and Louisiana to
adopt a strategy most favorable to their respective management poli-
cies. What emerged was a decision by the council, approved by the
Secretary, to have a simultaneous closure of the FCZ adjacent to
Texas' territorial waters with the closure of its territorial waters. Re-
duction of waste and improvement of the optimum yield of the
fishery in pounds landed provided the rationale for this provision.105
The council apparently believed that, while accommodating the
Louisiana fishery by not including a closure of the FCZ adjacent to
Louisiana, the national standards would be best served by adopting
Texas' policy in the FCZ adjacent to the states' territorial waters.
By convincing the Gulf Council that its scheme better fulfilled
the national standards articulated in the FCMA, Texas strongly in-
fluenced the fishing industry of Louisiana, and although the manage-
ment officials in Louisiana may choose to continue their policies, the
strategy adopted creates a strong incentive to adjust. In convincing
the council to maximize size and thus poundage of shrimp landed,
Texas' state management policy became the cornerstone of the re-
gional management effort. Before the FCMA's adoption, Texas had
no enforceable method of regulating fishing by nonresident fishermen
beyond its territorial waters and could regulate its fishermen only by
prohibiting landings of smaller shrimp in the state during the
closure.
VI. Conclusion
Although the FCMA is still young and questions remain about





Law of the Sea Treaty, the FCMA provides coastal states with new
input and impact on both foreign and domestic fishery management
policies. Historically, the states were the forgotten voice in the crea-
tion and development of foreign policy. The Act remedies this situa-
tion and provides the administrative and judicial avenues for effec-
tive input. More important, the Act permits the extension of wise
coastal state management policies into the FCZ beyond traditional
territorial sea boundaries resulting in pressures on states with less
wise management schemes to conform with the national standards
enunciated in the Act.
